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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Scott Alan Moore appeals from the district court’s order denying his
I.C. § 19-2604(3) motion to modify his felony conviction for aiding and abetting a
robbery to a misdemeanor.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In February 2003, Moore pled guilty to aiding and abetting a robbery.
(#42405 R., pp.41-46.1) The district court imposed a unified five-year sentence
with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (#42405 R., pp.5457.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended
Moore’s sentence and placed him on probation for five years. (#42405 R., pp.6570.)
In May 2014, Moore moved the district court to amend his felony robbery
conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(3). (#42405 R., pp.7779.) The prosecutor objected to the motion. (See #42405 R., p.81.) The district
court then denied the motion, concluding that the language of I.C. § 19-2604(3)
precluded it from amending Moore’s judgment of conviction without the
stipulation of the prosecutor. (#42405 R., pp.81-82.)
For the first time on appeal, Moore argued that the prosecutor stipulation
requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(3) violated the separation of powers provision of
the Idaho Constitution and the equal protection provisions of both the Idaho and
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The Idaho Supreme Court granted Moore’s motion to take judicial notice of the
appellate record from prior appeal No. 42405. (2/29/16 Order.)
1

United States Constitutions. See State v. Moore, 158 Idaho 943, 354 P.3d 505
(Ct. App. 2015).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of

Moore’s I.C. § 19-2604(3) motion, holding that Moore waved his constitutional
arguments by failing to raise them below, and that fundamental error analysis
was not applicable to Moore’s attempt to vindicate an alleged statutory right. Id.
Two months later, Moore filed a second I.C. § 19-2604(3) motion to
amend his 2003 felony conviction to a misdemeanor.

(R., pp.16-18.)

The

prosecutor again objected to the motion. (R., pp.25-26.) This time, in response
to the state’s objection, Moore argued that the prosecutor stipulation requirement
of I.C. § 19-2604(3) violated the separation of powers provision of the Idaho
Constitution, the due process clause of the United States Constitution, and the
equal protection provisions of both the Idaho and United States Constitutions.
(R., pp.32-49.) The district court denied the motion, again concluding that the
language of I.C. § 19-2604(3) precluded it from amending Moore’s judgment of
conviction without the stipulation of the prosecutor. (R., pp.62-73.) The court
also rejected Moore’s constitutional arguments. (Id.) Moore timely appealed.
(R., pp.74-79.)
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ISSUES
Moore states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the District Court err in ruling that § 19-2604’s
prosecutorial stipulation requirement does not violate Idaho’s
separation of powers doctrine?

2.

Did the District Court err in ruling that § 19-2604’s
prosecutorial stipulation requirement does not violate Mr.
Moore’s right to procedural due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?

3.

Did the District Court err in ruling that § 19-2604’s
prosecutorial stipulation requirement does not violate Mr.
Moore’s right to equal protection guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?

(Appellant’s brief, p.3)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Moore failed to show that the district court erred in rejecting his
argument that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the separation of powers
provision of the Idaho Constitution?

2.

Has Moore failed to show that the district court erred in rejecting his
argument that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the due process clause of the
United States Constitution?

3.

Has Moore failed to show that the district court erred in rejecting his
argument that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the equal protection provisions of
the Idaho and United States Constitutions?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Rejecting His
Argument That I.C. § 19-2604(3) Violates The Separation Of Powers Provision
Of The Idaho Constitution
A.

Introduction
Moore contends that the district court erred in rejecting his argument that

the prosecutor stipulation requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the
separation of powers provision of the Idaho Constitution. (Appellant’s brief, pp.512.) Moore’s argument fails because I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not deprive the
judicial branch of any inherent or constitutional power that rightly pertains to it.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court

reviews it de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the
statute. Id. The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute
that upholds its constitutionality. Id.
C.

Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Does Not Deprive The Judiciary Of Any Of Its
Inherent Or Constitutional Powers
Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution distributes power to the three

distinct departments of government, and provides that “no person or collection of
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,

4

except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.” Article V, § 13 of
the Idaho Constitution specifically prohibits the legislature from “depriv[ing] the
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it.”
Idaho Code § 19-2604 permits individuals to petition the district court, in
certain prescribed circumstances, to set aside their conviction, commute their
sentence, or amend their felony judgment of conviction to a misdemeanor. In
2013, the legislature amended I.C. § 19-2604(3) and expanded the applicability
of available relief under that subsection as follows:
(3) (a) In addition to the circumstances in which relief from a felony
conviction may be granted under subsections (1) and (2) of this
section, a defendant who has been convicted of a felony and who
has been discharged from probation may apply to the sentencing
court for a reduction of the conviction from a felony to a
misdemeanor as provided in this subsection.
(b) If less than five (5) years have elapsed since the defendant’s
discharge from probation, the application may be granted only if the
prosecuting attorney stipulates to the reduction.
(c) If at least five (5) years have elapsed since the defendant’s
discharge from probation, and if the defendant was convicted of
any of the following offenses, the application may be granted only if
the prosecuting attorney stipulates to the reduction: [List of
applicable offenses, including robbery, I.C. § 18-6501].
(d) The decision as to whether to grant such an application shall be
in the discretion of the district court, provided that the application
may be granted only if the court finds that:
(i) The defendant has not been convicted of any
felony committed after the conviction from which relief
is sought;
(ii) The defendant is not currently charged with any
crime;
(iii) There is good cause for granting the reduction in
sentence; and
5

(iv) In those cases where the stipulation of the
prosecuting attorney is required under paragraph (b) or
(c) of this subsection, the prosecuting attorney has so
stipulated.
(e) If the court grants the application, the court shall reduce the
felony conviction to a misdemeanor and amend the judgment of
conviction for a term in the custody of the state board of correction
to “confinement in a penal facility” for the number of days served
prior to the judgment of conviction.
S.L. 2013, ch. 256, § 1, eff. July 1, 2013.
Therefore, following the effective date of this amendment to the statute,
individuals convicted of robbery may, upon their discharge from probation,
petition the district court to amend their conviction to a misdemeanor. I.C. § 192604(3). However, the district court may exercise its discretion and consider
such a request only if the prosecutor stipulates to the reduction. Id.
In this case, Moore contends that I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the separation
of powers provisions of the Idaho Constitution because it unconstitutionally
delegates judicial powers to the prosecutor by limiting relief to those defendants
with whom the prosecuting attorney stipulates to relief. (Appellant’s brief, pp.512.) Moore’s assertion fails.
As the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.65-68), Idaho Code § 192604(3) does not deprive the judicial department of any inherent or constitutional
power.

The judicial department does not have the inherent or constitutional

power to reduce felony convictions years after a defendant is discharged from
probation. Indeed, to the contrary, it is well-settled in Idaho that a district court
has no jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment once the judgment becomes
final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on
6

appeal, unless a statute or rule extends its jurisdiction. State v. Jakoski, 139
Idaho 352, 354, 79 P.2d 711, 713 (2003).
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) is such a statute that grants a district court the
jurisdiction to amend an otherwise final judgment. The district court would not
have this power absent this statute.

Therefore, I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not

“deprive” the district court of any power that “rightly pertains” to the judiciary. The
subsection instead merely attaches conditions precedent, including the
stipulation of the prosecutor, to the grant of the statutory power.
Recently, in State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 110-112, 343 P.3d 1110, 11171119 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that the legislature does not
violate constitutional separation of powers provisions when it grants postjudgment sentence modification powers to the executive branch. In Thiel, the
Court analyzed I.C. § 20-621, which provides that any person serving a county
jail sentence is entitled to good-time credit upon the recommendation of the
sheriff.

Id. at 105-112, 343 P.3d at 1112-1119.

The Court first held that,

pursuant to the plain language of the statute, a sheriff’s recommendation for
good-time credit is binding upon the trial court. Id. at 107-110, 343 P.3d at 11141117.
The Court then held that I.C. § 20-621 does not violate the separation of
powers provision of the Idaho Constitution because it does not deprive the
judiciary of powers that properly belong to it.
1119.

Id. at 110-112, 343 P.3d at 1117-

The Court recognized that while the judiciary “has constitutionally

recognized authority in the sphere of conviction and judgment,” it does not have
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similar authority “in the period following the entry of judgment.” Id. at 110-111,
343 P.3d at 1117-1118 (citing Spanton v. Clapp, 78 Idaho 234, 238, 299 P.2d
1103, 1104 (1956)). Next, the Court noted that the executive branch “wields the
power to pardon and commute sentences,” and that the sheriff’s binding statutory
authority to recommend good-time credit is consistent with this power. Id. at 111,
343 P.3d at 1118. Finally, the Court recognized that the “early release scheme”
of I.C. § 20-621 “can be construed as falling within the legislature’s power to fix
punishment.” Id. (citing Malloroy v. State, 91 Idaho 914, 915, 435 P.2d 254, 255
(1967)). The Court summarized:
The legislature has the constitutional authority to identify and
define criminal acts, as well as the power to prescribe penalties for
these crimes. If it has the power to do these things, it surely has
the power to enact a targeted early-release scheme to lessen the
penalties for these crimes. Furthermore, the legislature has the
authority to delegate the good-behavior determination to an
executive branch agency.
Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in Thiel compels a similar conclusion
in the present case.

As discussed above, the judiciary has no inherent or

constitutional authority to modify a defendant’s felony conviction to a
misdemeanor after the conviction has become final. Further, the power granted
by I.C. § 19-2604(3) permitting prosecutors to veto charge reductions requested
by defendants who were convicted of certain violent felonies is consistent with
the executive branch’s power to commute sentences. Finally, I.C. § 19-2604(3)
can also be construed as falling within the legislature’s power to identify and
define criminal acts and to fix criminal punishment.

8

On appeal, Moore attempts to distinguish Thiel on the ground that in that
case, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the judicial branch has the
inherent or constitutional authority to modify a sentence after a judgment of
conviction becomes final, while the present case concerns whether the judicial
branch has the inherent or constitutional authority to modify a judgment of
conviction after the initial judgment of conviction becomes final.

(Appellant’s

brief, pp.11-12.) This is a distinction without a difference because the judiciary
possesses neither power independent of the legislature granting it through
statutes. While the judiciary clearly has the inherent and common law authority
to enter the initial judgment of conviction following a guilty plea or verdict,
I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not deprive the judiciary of this authority, or delegate this
authority to any other branch of government. Instead, I.C. § 19-2604(3) merely
applies conditions to the district court’s statutory post-judgment power to modify
a judgment of conviction that has become final – a power which, as discussed
above, the judiciary does not possess absent I.C. § 19-2604(3). Moore has
therefore failed to show that Thiel is distinguishable from the facts of the present
case.
Below and on appeal, Moore also cites State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486
P.2d 247 (1971), in which the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that a
legislatively-established mandatory minimum sentencing scheme violated the
separation of powers provision of the Idaho Constitution because it deprived the
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judiciary of its power, established at common law, to suspend a sentence. 2
(Appellant’s

brief,

pp.6-7;

R.,

pp.39-40.)

However,

McCoy

is

plainly

distinguishable from the present case. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in
Thiel with respect to I.C. § 20-621:
The facts presented in this case are not the same as those
in McCoy. The Court’s holding in McCoy was premised on courts
possessing, at common law, the power to suspend a sentence.
However, a suspension is not the same as a commutation. For
one, “[a] commutation diminishes the severity of a sentence, e.g.
shortens the term of punishment,” while a suspension delays the
entry of a sentence. Standlee v. State, 96 Idaho 849, 852, 538
P.2d 778, 781 (1975). More importantly, whereas the authority to
suspend a sentence rests with the judiciary at common law, courts
do not similarly possess the power at common law to commute a
sentence. A commutation is inherently a creature of the executive
branch.
Thiel, 158 Idaho at 111, 343 P.3d at 1118. The facts of the present case are
similarly distinguishable from McCoy.

Likewise, other cases relied upon by

Moore, such as People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564 (Cal. 2005); People v. Tenorio,
473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1970), and Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 485 P.2d 1140 (Cal.
1971) (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8), in which statutes were deemed to violate
constitutional separation of powers provisions, similarly pertain, as in McCoy,
only to the divesting of a trial court’s pre-judgment authority over criminal cases.
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) does not unconstitutionally divest power of the
judiciary to the executive branch. Moore has therefore failed to demonstrate that
the district court erred in denying his motion to reduce his felony conviction to a
misdemeanor.
2

An amendment to the Idaho Constitution later expressly granted the legislature
the power to enact mandatory minimum sentences that would limit a trial court’s
sentencing discretion. See Idaho Const. art. V, § 13.
10

II.
Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Rejecting His
Argument That I.C. § 19-2604(3) Violates The Due Process Clause Of The
United States Constitution
A.

Introduction
Moore contends that the district court erred in concluding that the

prosecutor stipulation requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not violate the due
process clause of the United States Constitution. (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)
This argument fails because Moore had no liberty interest in his felony conviction
being reduced to a misdemeanor.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court

reviews it de novo.

Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131.

The party

challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome a strong
presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the statute. Id.
The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute that upholds
its constitutionality. Id.
C.

The Prosecutor Stipulation Requirement Of I.C. § 19-2604(3) Does Not
Violate The Due Process Clause Of The United States Constitution
“The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and

United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process
be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” State v.
Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827 (Ct. App. 2010). However, before
an individual is entitled to due process, he or she must have a liberty or property
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interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573,
575, 930 P.2d 603, 605 (1996).
The mere hope that a sentence will be reduced or its execution
suspended is not a recognized liberty interest. See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho
138, 141-142, 30 P.3d 293, 296-297 (2001). When the state has not “given
back” a liberty interest that was taken from a defendant at sentencing, “no due
process is necessary to continue the denial of the liberty interest.” Id. (citing
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11
(1979)); see also Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-143, 30 P.3d at 297-298
(distinguishing relinquishment of jurisdiction, which does not require due process
because there is no liberty interest, from revocation of probation, which does
require due process because a liberty interest is being lost).
A state statute may create a liberty interest which implicates constitutional
due process. The United States Supreme Court enunciated the following test to
determine whether a liberty interest was created by state statutes or regulations:
Stated simply, ‘a State creates a protected liberty interest by
placing substantive limitations on official discretion.’ [Citation
omitted.] A State may do this in a number of ways. Neither the
drafting of regulations nor their interpretation can be reduced to an
exact science. Our past decisions suggest, however, that the most
common manner in which a State creates a liberty interest is by
establishing ‘substantive predicates' to govern official decision
making, [citation omitted] and, further, by mandating the outcome to
be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met.
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989).
In this case, as the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.64-65),
I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not create a liberty interest in charge reduction, and thus,

12

the constitutional due process clause was not implicated.

Moore was not

deprived of any benefit that he already possessed. Instead, Moore possessed
only a “mere hope” that the prosecutor would stipulate to his request that the
district court reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor, and that the district
court would then exercise its discretion to grant the request. Further, I.C. § 192604 does not mandate charge reduction upon a finding that relevant criteria
have been met. The statute instead permits modification, expressly pursuant to
the discretion of the trial court, and upon the stipulation of the prosecutor, who is
likewise not bound to grant such a stipulation under any particular circumstances.
Moore has failed to demonstrate that he possessed a liberty interest that
implicated the constitutional due process clause.

He has therefore failed to

demonstrate that the district court erred by rejecting his constitutional due
process argument.
III.
Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Rejecting His
Argument That I.C. § 19-2604(3) Violates The Equal Protection Provisions Of
The Idaho And United States Constitutions
A.

Introduction
Moore contends that the district court erred in concluding that the

prosecutor stipulation requirement of I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not violate the equal
protection provisions of the Idaho and United States Constitutions. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.13-16.) Moore has failed to meet his initial burden to demonstrate that
he was treated differently by virtue of some classification between himself and
any ““similarly situated” group.

In the alternative, Moore has failed to
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demonstrate that the district court erred in concluding that the legislature’s
decision to distinguish between individuals convicted of certain violent felonies
and individuals convicted of lesser felonies was not rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court

reviews it de novo.

Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131.

The party

challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome a strong
presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the statute. Id.
The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute that upholds
its constitutionality. Id.
C.

Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) Does Not Violate The Equal Protection Clause
Of Either The Idaho Or United States Constitutions
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands

that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws, which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike. State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 316, 324 P.3d 1006, 1015 (Ct.
App. 2014).
The “first step in an equal protection analysis is to identify the
classification at issue.” Bagley v. Thomason, 155 Idaho 193, 198, 307 P.3d
1219, 1224 (2013) (internal quotes and citations omitted).

Where a party

claiming an equal protection violation has failed to identify a valid classification,
the Court will not review that claim because “this Court does not consider issues
14

not supported by argument or authority.” Id. The second step is to articulate the
standard under which the classification will be tested.

State v. Mowrey, 134

Idaho 751, 754, 9 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2000). In Mowrey, the Idaho Supreme Court
described the equal protection standards as follows:
When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict scrutiny
applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate
scrutiny applies to classifications involving gender and illegitimacy;
and rational basis scrutiny applies to all other challenges. For
analyses made under the Idaho Constitution, slightly different levels
of scrutiny apply. Strict scrutiny, as under federal law, applies to
fundamental rights and suspect classes. Means-focus scrutiny,
unlike the federal intermediate scrutiny, is employed “where the
discriminatory character of a challenged statutory classification is
apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of a
lack of relationship between the classification and the declared
purpose of the statute.”
Id. at 754-755, 9 P.3d at 1220-1221.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also described the “means-focus scrutiny”
standard as being applicable where the challenged classification is “obviously
invidiously discriminatory,” which requires the statute to “distinguish between
individuals or groups either odiously or on some other basis calculated to excite
animosity or ill will.” McLean v. Maverick County Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810,
814, 135 P.3d 756, 760 (2006) (quoting Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560,
569, 38 P.3d 598, 607 (2001)).
In this case, Moore asserts that the prosecutor stipulation requirement of
I.C. § 19-2604(3) violates the equal protection clauses of the Idaho and United
States Constitutions by treating individuals who have committed certain
enumerated violent felonies differently than those who have committed less
serious felonies. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-16.)
15

Moore argues that the district court erred in two respects.

First, he

contends that the district court erred by applying the rational basis test to analyze
the relevant classification rather than the “means-focus scrutiny” test specific to
the Idaho Constitution. (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-16.) Second, Moore contends
that regardless of which test is applicable, the district court erred in concluding
that the statute’s classification did not violate the equal protection clauses of the
Idaho and United States Constitutions. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.) Moore has
failed to show that the district court erred.
First, Moore has failed to meet his initial burden to demonstrate that he
was treated differently by virtue of some classification. An individual convicted of
one of the felonies enumerated in I.C. § 19-2604(3) is not “similarly situated,” for
equal protection purposes, to an individual who was convicted of some other
felony. Those two individuals are guilty of different crimes, are culpable for the
commission of those different crimes, and are subject to the separate penalties
and post-judgment charge reduction opportunities associated with those crimes.
Moore’s equal protection challenge therefore fails.3 See, e.g., State v. Rawlings,
159 Idaho 498, ___, 363 P.3d 339, 343 (2015) (rejecting equal protection
challenge to classification drawn by the legislature in enacting criminal statute).
Further, even if Moore identified a classification subject to further equal
protection analysis, he has failed to show that the district court erred. First, the
district court correctly analyzed Moore’s equal protection claim under the rational
3

While the district court rejected Moore’s equal protection challenge after
applying the rational basis standard (R., pp.65-68), this Court may affirm the
district court’s order on any correct legal theory. See, e.g., State v. Avelar, 129
Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997).
16

basis test. The stated purpose of the relevant 2013 amendment to I.C. § 192604(3) is “to allow courts to reduce felony convictions to misdemeanors and
amend judgments of conviction in certain circumstances.” Statement of Purpose,
RS 22199, S.B. 1151 (2013). There is no “patent indication” of a lack of
relationship between this stated purpose and classifying those who have
committed certain violent felonies differently than those who have committed less
serious felonies with respect to charge reduction requests.

Further, this

classification does not “distinguish between individuals or groups either odiously
or on some other basis calculated to excited animosity or ill will.” Therefore,
“means-focus scrutiny” in inapplicable to this case.
The

district

court also

correctly concluded

that

the

challenged

classification passed the constitutional rational basis scrutiny test. (R., pp.6568.) Under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions, a classification will
pass rational basis scrutiny if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose and “if there is any conceivable state of facts which will support it.”
Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 262, 954 P.2d 676, 680 (1998)
(quoting Bint v. Creative Forest Prods., 108 Idaho 116, 120, 697 P.2d 818, 822
(1985)).
The state has a legitimate state interest in imposing criminal punishment,
protecting the community from criminals, and deterring criminal conduct. See
Mowrey, 134 Idaho at 755, 9 P.3d at 1221; State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 610,
167 P.3d 357, 361 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106, 233
P.3d 33, 37 (2009). In furthering these legitimate state interests, it is rational for
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the legislature to distinguish those convicted of certain violent felony crimes, such
as robbery, from those convicted of less serious felonies. This is true in the
contexts of both criminal punishment, and post-judgment opportunities for
sentence modification or charge reduction.
In Mowrey, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a similar equal protection
challenge made to the version of I.C. § 19-2604 which was in effect at the time.
Mowrey, 134 Idaho at 754-756, 9 P.3d at 1220-1222.

Mowrey argued that

I.C. § 19-2604 unconstitutionality discriminated against individuals who had been
convicted of certain sexual offenses against minors because it allowed
individuals convicted of certain other sexual offenses against minors to have their
convictions be reduced to misdemeanors.

Id.

Applying the rational basis

standard, the Court concluded that the classification was rationally related to
legitimate state interests of protecting children and increasing the penalties for
certain sexual crimes against children. Id. The Court further recognized that the
fact that the charge modification opportunity of I.C. § 19-2604 “did not cover
every conceivable statute under which a person could be convicted of such acts”
did not diminish this rational relationship.

Id.

Similarly, the equal protection

clauses of the Idaho and United States Constitutions do not prohibit the state
legislature from imposing the I.C. § 19-2604(3) prosecutor stipulation
requirement only upon those individuals convicted of certain violent felonies.
Idaho Code § 19-2604(3) does not violate the equal protection clauses of
the Idaho or United States Constitutions.

Moore has therefore failed to

demonstrate that the district court erred by rejecting his constitutional equal
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protection challenge.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order denying Moore’s I.C. § 19-2604(3) motion to amend the judgment of
conviction entered upon his guilty plea to aiding and abetting a robbery.
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2016.
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